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BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS:
AGENCY STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
AS AN AUTONOMOUS ENTERPRISE*
I Introduction
John Willis was not just a voice crying in the wilderness. But he was that
too. He warned repeatedly about the emptiness of administrative lawyers'
taste for 'separation of powers,' 'democracy,' and 'rule-of-law' talk, a
discourse he labelled 'theology.'1 By that epithet Willis meant to signal
that much of the conversation had little to do with the practical affairs of
governance. And he lamented on numerous occasions the profound
failure of administrative lawyers to pay close attention to what administra-
tive agencies actually do, how they do it, and the internal ethics that both
motivate and restrain their behaviour. Willis described himself as 'a gov-
ernment man' or 'a legislation man' and 'a what actually happens man,2
but he recognized that the profession was much more interested in
remedies against government, usually in court, than in how administra-
tion could be organized to solve pressing social problems.
Willis and his realist brethren can hardly be said to have had no
impact. Yet I would be hard-pressed to describe administrative law schol-
arship in the 100th year afterJohn Willis's birth, and many decades after
much of his writing, as devoted principally to non-theological topics.
There is hardly a better illustration of this tendency than the subject that
my article begins to address. And, while I will be treating of matters
* Sterling Professor of Law and Management, Yale University.
t With apologies to Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, trans. by William Rehg
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996). I owe an enormous debt of gratitude to Josh
Rosenstein, Mike Shumsky, and Steven Wu for research assistance in the preparation
of this article. The present text is a revision of an article first published as 'Agency
Statutory Interpretation' in Philip Frickey, ed., Issues in Legal Scholarship: Dynamic
Statutory Interpretation (Berkeley, CA: Berkeley Electronic Press, 2002), online: Berkeley
Electronic Press <http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss3/art9>.
1 Perhaps the strongest statement of this isJohn Willis, 'Canadian Administrative Law in
Retrospect' (1974) 24 U.T.L.J. 225 ['Retrospect']. In other writings Willis sometimes
characterized the usual approach as 'conceptual' - seeJohn Willis, 'Three Approaches
to Administrative Law: The Judicial, the Conceptual, and the Functional' (1935) 1
U.T.L.J. 53 [ 'Three Approaches'] - or 'ideological,' as in his famous send up of the
McRuer Report:John Willis, 'The McRuer Report: Lawyers' Values and Civil Servants'
Values' (1968) 18 U.T.L.J. 351 ['Lawyers' Values'].
2 Willis, 'Retrospect,' supra note 1 at 227.
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American, I do not detect a substantial shift in the orientation of law talk,
at least administrative law talk, in other English-speaking jurisdictions.
As many readers will know, the US Supreme Court shocked many
American administrative lawyers two decades ago when, in its Chevron3
decision, it articulated a broad doctrine of deference to agency interpre-
tations of the statutes that define their goals and empower the agencies
to achieve them. Emphasizing the vanishingly thin lines between policy
making and statutory interpretation and stressing the appropriateness of
political rather than legal controls over policy making, the Court de-
clared that federal courts were to uphold agency statutory interpretations
unless the agency's interpretation was clearly erroneous or unreasonable.
Although there is much reason to believe that Chevron merely gave
legitimating voice to standard judicial practice, the professional storyline
was quite different. On that account, the Supreme Court was flouting the
Administrative Procedure Act's injunction that courts 'decide all relevant
questions of law' and 'interpret ... statutory provisions.'4
Since Chevron, forests have been laid waste to accommodate the
outpouring of legal commentary on that decision and its progeny. As
John Willis might have predicted, many saw the Chevron decision's appro-
val of political rather than judicial control as evidence of the collapse of
the rule of law. And because political control of administration is often
through the executive branch rather than the legislature, the decision
suggested to some the decline of democracy as well. Others, however,
applauded the Supreme Court's recognition of presidential direction of
administration as the true source of democratic legitimacy in the admin-
istrative state. Whatever commentators felt about Chevron, it was clear that
'democracy' and 'rule-of-law' talk had triumphed again.
Indeed, although all of these commentators seem to have recognized
that the Chevron decision validated agency statutory interpretation as an
autonomous enterprise, virtually no one has even asked, much less
answered, some simple questions about agency statutory interpretation: 5
3 Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) [Chevron].
4 5 U.S.C. § 706.
5 A striking exception is an article by Peter Strauss analysing the case for agency use of
legislative history. Peter Strauss, 'When the Judge Is Not the Primary Official with
Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History'
(1990) 66 Chi.-Kent L.Rev. 321 [ 'When the Judge'].
A number of articles have titles suggesting an analysis of administrative interpretation,
but on examination they turn out to be about other topics. For example, Edward Rubin,
'Law and Legislation in the Administrative State' (1989) 89 Colum.L.Rev. 369 ['Law and
Legislation'], is an argument for abandoning the philosophical conception of laws as
rules of conduct in a world where much of the legislative landscape is populated with
statutes that merely confer authority on agencies. Colin Diver, 'Statutory Interpretation
in the Administrative State' (1985) 133 U.Pa.L.Rev. 549, like many other articles with
similar titles, is about where and how courts should defer to agency interpretation, not
HeinOnline -- 55 U. Toronto L.J. 498 2005
BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS 499
As a factual matter, how do agencies interpret statutes? Are there distinc-
tive interpretive methodologies that appeal to administrators? In what
contexts? With what effects? And, on the normative side, How should
administrative agencies approach their interpretive task? As John Willis
recognized, the fact that administration operates autonomously much of
the time need not mean - indeed, should not mean - that it has no
internal normative direction.6 Surely, in a legal world where agencies are
of necessity the primary official interpreters of federal statutes and where
that role has been judicially legitimated as presumptively controlling,
attention to agencies' interpretative methodology seems more than
warranted.
I should add that the question of the appropriate scope of judicial
review of agency interpretation of their governing statutes is not a
uniquely American problem. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a legal system
that uses general courts for the review of administrative action in which
how agencies do or should interpret. Mark Burge, 'Regulatory Reform in the Chevron
Doctrine: Can Congress Force Better Decisionmaking by Courts and Agencies?' Note
(1997) 75 Tex.L.Rev. 1095 ['Regulatory Reform'], comes close to discussing the topic,
but it ends up being an interesting proposal for 'proceduralizing' agency interpretation
in the context of the issuance of rules of general applicability.
In 1989 the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS), the body once
charged with recommending best practices to federal administrative agencies, issued
a recommendation concerning agency interpretation. The ACUS, once again analysing
Chevron, provided the following startling advice: 'In developing an interpretation of a
statute that is intended to be definitive, an agency should use procedures such as
rulemaking, formal adjudication, or other procedures authorized by Congress for, and
otherwise appropriate to, the development of definitive agency statutory interpre-
tations.' Recommendation 89-5, 54 Fed. Reg. 29,964 (1989). The ACUS did much
important work, but one could sympathize with a representative who read
Recommendation 89-5 and voted to 'zero out' the ACUS appropriation line.
Cass Sunstein, 'Is Tobacco a Drug: Administrative Agencies as Common Law Courts'
(1998) 47 Duke L.J. 1013, argues that administrative agencies are the principal
interpreters of statutes and that, as a matter of practice, they have taken on the role of
'updating' the law - a responsibility that was long the province of common law courts.
He argues further that Chevron legitimated this role. (Michael W. Spicer and Larry D.
Terry take a similar view in 'Administrative Interpretation of Statutes: A Constitutional
View on the "New World Order" of Public Administration' (1996) 56 Pub.Admin.Rev.
38.) This article, in a sense, takes up where Sunstein's leaves off. Assuming thatSunstein
is correct, which I believe he is, what does this new administrative role look like, and
what normative principles should guide it?
Executive branch interpretation has received more attention in the literature, but
most commentary is devoted to the interpretation of the Constitution and to separation
of powers issues that swirl around the notion of the 'Unitary Executive' (see generally
Symposium, Executive Branch Interpretation of the Law' (1993) 15 Cardozo L.Rev. 21)
or the role of theJustice Department as 'legal advisor' to the President and to executive
branch agencies. See, e.g., Randolph Moss, 'Executive Branch Legal Interpretation: A
Perspective from the Office of Legal Counsel' (2000) 52 Admin.L.Rev. 1303.
6 See particularly, Willis, 'Lawyers' Values,' supra note 1.
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this would not be a vexing, and perhaps vexed, problem. While I have
neither the space nor the competence to review the doctrinal position in
all the major Commonwealth jurisdictions, 7 conflict about the level of
deference to be given to agency statutory interpretation is not difficult to
find in Canada,' Australia, 9 and the United Kingdom. l°
This article begins a discussion of administrative interpretation as an
autonomous enterprise. It will approach administrative interpretation as
a legal practice in its own right, having its own customs and normative
constraints. While comparisons will be made with judicial practice, my
interest is not in the relationship of courts and agencies. The attempt,
instead, is to begin to understand both the normative and the positive
dimensions of administrative agency interpretation of statutory language.
The normative analysis asks what norms a responsible administrator
should observe when engaging in statutory interpretation. The positive
inquiry, by contrast, seeks to describe agency interpretive practice. These
approaches are obviously isomorphic to the way the judiciocentric legal
literature tends to talk about judicial interpretation of statutes.
7 See Michael Taggart: The Contribution of Lord Cooke to Scope of Review Doctrine
in Administrative Law: A Comparative Common Law Perspective in Paul Rishworth,
ed., The Strugglefor Simplicity in the Law: Essaysfor Lord Cooke of Thorndon (Wellington,
NZ: Butterworths, 1997) 189. Michael C. Tolley, 'Judicial Review of Agency Inter-
pretation of Statutes: Deference Doctrines and Comparative Perspective' (2003) 31
Pol.Stud.J. 421, surveys the position in Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and
South Africa in addition to the United States.
8 Frank lacobucci, 'Articulating a Rational Standard of Review Doctrine: A Tribute to
John Willis' (2002) 27 Queen's L.J. 859.
9 Administrative Review Council, The Scope of Judicial Review: Discussion Paper (2003),
online: Government of Australia <http://www.law.gov.au/agd/www/archome.nsf/
Page/RWPD6CCADOEEC1FCFFECA256CF400040EF8?OpenDocument>; Enfield City
Corp. v. Development Assessment Commission (2000), 199 C.L.R. 135 (H.C.A.) (containing
an explicit reference to and rejection of Chevron). See Margaret Allars, 'Chevron in
Australia: A Duplicitous Rejection?' (2002) 54 Admin.L.R. 569; and see generally Mark
Aronson, Bruce Dyer, & Matthew Groves, Judicial Review ofAdministrative Action, 3d ed
(Sydney: Thomson Lawbook, 2004) at 181-4.
10 See, e.g., T.R.S. Allen, 'Constitutional Dialogue and theJustification ofJudicial Review'
(2003) 23 Oxford J.Legal Stud. 563; Janet McLean, 'The Crown and Contract in
Administrative Law' (2004) 24 Oxford J.Legal Stud. 129. Compare Anisminic Ltd. v.
Foreign Compensation Commission (1968), [1969] 2 A.C. 147 (H.L.); Page v. Hull University
Visitor (1992), [1993] A.C. 682 (H.L.); and Southern Yorkshire Transport Ltd. v. Monopolies
and Mergers Commissioner (1992), [1993] 1 W.L.R. 23 (H.L.).
New Zealand follows British doctrine. The leading case seems to be Bulk Gas Users
Group v. Attorney General [1983] N.Z.L.R. 129 (C.A.). If anything, the language of the
New Zealand cases is even stronger than that of their British counterparts in asserting
the final authority of the courts to decide questions of law, including questions of
statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Minister ofJustice, [1991] 2 N.Z.L.R. 530
(C.A.); Fulcher v. Parole Board, [1997] 15 C.R.N.Z. 222 (C.A.); and Chiu v. Minister of
Immigration, [1994] 2 N.Z.L.R. 541 (C.A.).
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This discussion is highly tentative, often conclusory, perhaps some-
times even question-begging. The topic is vast, and this article cannot
hope to provide an exhaustive analysis. Moreover, the discussion operates
in an awkward space, as its title suggests, between facts and norms. For I
will be positing normative propositions about how agencies should
interpret statutes based largely on what I take to be the position of
administrative agencies in the scheme of American governance. I will be
proposing what John Willis might have called 'civil servants' values' as
they relate to the project of statutory interpretation, but I will be arguing
for those propositions, not from the empirical facts of the matter, but
from what my late colleague Charles Black might have called the 'struc-
ture and function' 1 of administrators within the American constitutional
system. To put it slightly differently, I will be hypothesizing what I believe
to be the position that responsible administrators should take towards sta-
tutory interpretation given their position in the American constitutional
order (norms) and the practical necessities of administration (facts).
The concrete reason for this 'hypothetical' stance will become clear
when the article turns to the description of agency practice. I have not at
this stage been able to recover or explore administrators' internal
normative perspective on these matters, only something about some of
their practices.
But this inquiry also operates between facts and norms in a more
profound sense recognized byJfirgen Habermas's book and by some of
John Willis's writings. For we have yet to construct an ideal of administra-
tive legitimacy that accommodates the generalized discourse of law in
courts to the profoundly different discourse of law in action, particularly
where most of that action is in the form of public administration.
II Interpretive norms
Lawyers and legal academics argue endlessly and inconclusively about the
norms that should guide judicial interpretation of federal statutes. Much
of this conversation has a constitutional or structural flavour.1 2 It focuses
on the separation of powers and the appropriate role for courts in the
11 CharlesL. Black, Structure and Relationship in ConstitutionalLaw (Baton Rouge: Louisiana
State University Press, 1985).
12 Indeed, I have argued elsewhere that all such arguments must be at base arguments
about constitutional appropriateness.Jerry L. Mashaw, 'Textualism, Constitutionalism,
and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes' (1991) 32 Wm.& Mary L.Rev. 827
['Textualism']. See alsojerry L. Mashaw, 'As If Republican Interpretation' (1988)'97
Yale L.J. 1685. Cass Sunstein seems to agree. See Cass Sunstein, 'Interpreting Statutes
in the Regulatory State' (1989) 103 Harv.L.Rev. 405. So does Nick Rosenkranz,
although he takes both Sunstein and me to task for the vagueness of our approaches.
See Nick Quinn Rosenkranz, 'Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation' (2002) 115
Harv.L.Rev. 2085 ['Federal Rules'].
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elaboration of the legal order. We grapple continually with the studied
ambiguity of the judicial role in a constitutional system that seems to
presume legislative supremacy in law-making but then subjects that sup-
reme role to both authoritative interpretation and constitutional control
by reviewing courts.
But separation of powers issues hardly exhaust our normative inter-
ests. Much of the literature on statutory interpretation in courts is also
directed to what I will call 'prudential' normative concerns. Because
'ought' implies 'can,' we argue incessantly about the competence of
courts when they approach the task of interpreting legislative utterances.
And this leads us into further disputes about the appropriate evidentiary
base for statutory interpretation as well as the most effective means for
carrying out the judiciary's self-proclaimed constitutional responsibility
'to say what the law is.' 13
Indeed, most methodological disputes have both constitutional and
prudential dimensions. Many arguments about judicial competence are
vague about their normative foundations because 'competence' can
convey a concern for either 'authority' or 'capacity.' Because 'capacity' is
also a functionalist argument for allocating 'authority,' this conceptual
confusion seems almost inherent in the interpretive debate.
Analysis of the normative dimensions of administrative interpretation
can usefully be organized around these same themes of constitutional
demand and prudential concern. I might even have said that agency sta-
tutory interpretation must be analysed along these two dimensions. United
States v. Mead Corporation,14 the Supreme Court's most recent, extended
attempt to explain its Chevron doctrine, informs us that we must cope
with two types of deference to agency statutory interpretation - Chevron 5
deference and Skidmore16 deference. But these iconic cases have strikingly
different rationales. Chevron relies on constitutional structure, namely
Congress's legitimate authority to delegate law-making power to adminis-
trative agencies and the political accountability of those agencies to the
president and to Congress. Skidmore, by contrast, sounds in 'capacity' or
'expertise,' the potential for accurate understanding by agencies im-
mersed in both the politics of congressional enactment and the day-to-
day administration of statutory texts.
A CONSTITUTIONAL DEMANDS
In some sense the position of agencies as 'faithful agents' of the legisla-
ture has a constitutional clarity that exceeds that of the judiciary. While
13 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 at 177 (1803).
14 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) [Mead Corp.].
15 Chevron, supra note 3.
16 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
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American courts must somehow balance their position as faithful agents
of the Constitution and the Congress, agencies seem to enjoy a less
conflicted constitutional role. However moribund in practice, the non-
delegation doctrine1 7 - the requirement that agencies must be given a
legislative mandate that contains intelligible guiding principles - makes
agencies, first and foremost, agents of the Congress. That agencies are a
part of the executive branch does not significantly alter this structural
position. Agencies are the means by which the executive carries out its
constitutional responsibility to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed. ' 8 Continual competition between presidents and congresses
for control of administration is both a structural feature of the American
Constitution and a stark fact of American political life. But, as a norma-
tive constitutional matter, it is generally not a good interpretive argu-
ment for an agency to say simply, 'The president told me to interpret the
statute that way.' By contrast, 'The statute made me do it,' however
empirically contestable in any particular instance, has the hallowed ring
of constitutional legitimacy.
Yet the meaning of 'faithful agency' is never uncomplicated, and
agencies operate in a political milieu that raises a number of additional
issues - questions that look quite different from an agency's perspective
than from the bench's. Think again about agencies' relationship to the
president. The president issues executive orders, which, if constitutional,
are binding on administrative agencies. Executive orders are of many
types, but in recent years orders attempting to structure agencies'
deliberative processes have been a prominent means of presidential
control over a far-flung federal bureaucracy.' 0 Executive orders demand-
ing that agencies engage in regulatory cost-benefit analyses, consider the
effects of their actions on small public and private entities, or consult
with affected state and local authorities are intended to shape the way
agencies interpret their mandates and carry out their statutory duties. To
put it another way, they are meant to shape agency interpretation by
nudging discretionary judgements in one direction or another. Agency
recalcitrance in the face of a valid executive order is neither politically
prudent nor constitutionally appropriate. And presidential delegations of
authority to monitor agency compliance with these demands - to the
17 For a general discussion see Jerry L. Mashaw, Richard A. Merrill, & Peter M. Shane.,
Administrative Law: The American Public Law System, 4th ed. (St. Paul, MN: Thomson/
West, 1998) at 56-84 [Administrative Law]. For a recent treatment of the doctrine as
essentially an interpretive canon, seeJohn F. Manning, 'The Non-Delegation Doctrine
as a Canon of Avoidance' [2000] Sup.Ct.Rev. 223.
18 U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.
19 For a recent analysis of both the practice and the normative appropriateness of
presidential direction of administration, see generally Elena Kagan, 'Presidential
Administration' (2001) 114 Harv.L.Rev. 2245.
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Office of Management and Budget or the vice president or the Presi-
dent's Council on Environmental Quality - are a common feature of the
modem 'managerial' presidency.
Presidents obviously also attempt to shape agency action by a host of
less formal actions, including letters, conversations, Rose Garden speech-
es, legislative proposals, and bill-signing statements. There is some
hesitancy about the legal authority of the president to engage in certain
types of steering activities with respect to so-called independent agencies.
But, with regard to executive branch agencies that are not protected by
special appointment or removal provisions, there seems no constitutional
difficulty with admitting that these agencies are bound to follow presi-
dential direction to the extent that it is consistent with their statutory
authority. Indeed, were this not the case, constitutional ideals would be
wildly inconsistent with political reality, and the political accountability of
agency personnel would be radically reduced.20
Hence, both as a practical political and as a normative constitutional
matter, we should expect agencies to interpret statutes in the context of
presidential direction. To that degree, of course, the faithful administra-
tive agent confronts a multiple-principals problem that is quite different
from that facing Article III courts. Executive orders and executive direc-
tives are by and large irrelevant to judicial construction of statutes. Many
executive orders state that they are intended to have no effect outside the
executive branch, and judicial practice presumes that limitation even in
the absence of a formal statement.2 Save in those rare instances where
presidents have been given clear statutory or constitutional authority to
guide judicial interpretation by presidential pronouncement, the failure
of the court to exercise interpretive judgement independent of presiden-
tial preferences would be an abandonment of what we imagine to be the
constitutionally appropriate role of the federal judiciary. By contrast, for
agencies of the executive branch to ignore legitimate presidential instruc-
tion would be for them to ignore their appropriate place in the constitu-
tional order. One need not believe in some constitutionally problematic
version of 'the unitary executive' to believe that political control over
administration by elected chief executives is a critical feature of our demo-
20 Kagan cites and discusses much of the relevant literature; see generally ibid. Suffice it
to say that the situation is not quite so straightforward and non-controversial as the text
suggests. Moreover, in practice, the president's capacity to influence 'line' or
'independent' agency policy, including interpretive practice, may have more to do with
situational contingencies than with statutory attempts at insulation. See Neal Devins,
'Political Will and the Unitary Executive: What Makes an Independent Agency
Independent?' (1993) 15 Cardozo L.Rev. 273 at 282-4.
21 For a discussion see Mashaw et al., Administrative Law, supra note 17 at 249-52.
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cratic constitutional order and one that should shape agency approaches
to the interpretation of statutes.22
Consider also the position of agencies with respect to the direct
implementation of the Constitution. American administrative agencies
are obviously bound by the Constitution and must often implement it
directly. Agency hearing processes, for example, must satisfy constitu-
tional due process requirements. And federal law enforcement officials
make thousands of decisions every day that require an interpretation of
the Fourth Amendment's search-and-seizure provisions. But how should
the potential for constitutional difficulty influence an agency's construc-
tion of some statute that it is charged with implementing? We know that
there is ajudicial canon of statutory construction, based on principles of
constitutional comity, that counsels courts to avoid constructions of
statutes that would raise serious constitutional questions about their
validity.23 Are agencies in a similar position?
Arguably not. They have no general responsibility for constitutional
review of congressional action whose aggressive or imprudent exercise
might threaten the legitimacy ofjudicial review and thereby weaken the
constitutional order. Indeed, intense agency attention to avoiding
constitutional questions in interpreting the statutes entrusted to their
care would often foreclose authoritative resolution of constitutional
questions by the judiciary. To put the point in its strongest form, an
administrative apparatus that operated in the shadow of the avoidance
canon would effectively set itself up as the sole arbiter of the constitution-
ality of congressional action. Administrative avoidance would thus settle
the constitutional question save in those extremely rare instances where
the agency has no discretion to withhold action that would arguably
violate constitutional constraints. And, obviously, administrators who fail
to pursue implementation any time a constitutional issue looms on their
horizon could not possibly carry out their legislative mandates effectively.
Constitutionally timid administration both compromises faithful agency
22 For an interesting and provocative case study of presidential direction of agency
interpretation, see Michael Herz, 'Imposing Unified Executive Branch Statutory
Interpretation' (1993) 15 Cardozo L.Rev. 219.
23 This article assumes the validity of the conventional view regarding the effects of this
'constitutional avoidance' canon. But there are reasons to believe that a constitutionally
induced 'misconstruction' of a congressional statute may disable the Congress in a
more fundamental way than would invalidation through judicial review. See Jerry L.
Mashaw, Greed, Chaos and Governance: Using Public Choice to Improve Public Law (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997) at 101-3. Indeed, the origins of this approach
to interpretation may lie in the courts' felt need for some means to review and
invalidate legislation in an era, or under constitutional systems, where judicial review
was or is viewed as constitutionally illegitimate.
HeinOnline -- 55 U. Toronto L.J. 505 2005
506 UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAWJOURNAL
and potentially usurps the role of the judiciary in harmonizing congres-
sional power and constitutional command.2 4
Yet this sharp distinction between administrative implementation and
judicial review can hardly mean that agencies should be inattentive to
constitutional norms. An agency told by statute to provide parties
appearing before it with a 'hearing' should surely pay serious attention to
the constitutional minima that the Supreme Court has specified for
individualized adjudications.25 It may decide that by 'hearing' Congress
meant more than the Constitution might demand, but we would think it
odd, absent extraordinary circumstances, for the agency to find that
Congress meant less. And, as the BobJone?6 case reminds us, it is certainly
appropriate for an agency such as the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to
interpret seemingly unrelated statutory provisions in the light of constitu-
tional non-discrimination norms and in the context of non-revenue
statutes that implement constitutionally grounded non-discrimination
commitments. The line between being a constitutionally 'sensitive'
faithful agent (interpreting statutes within the overall context of the legal
order) and usurping both congressional and judicial authority to inter-
pret the Constitution is obviously a fine one. But that is the peculiar
normative constitutional tension within which administrative interpreta-
tion must proceed.
The Bob Jones case, of course, raises another concern about administra-
tive agencies' interpretive responsibilities. Courts repeatedly suggest that
interpretation designed to lend coherence to the general legal order is
one of their most important responsibilities as custodians of the rule of
law. Guido Calabresi 27 and Ronald Dworkin 28 have suggested, for in-
stance, that fitting statutory language within the overall topography of
the law is the principal function of courts as independent interpreters.
Surely agencies have a somewhat similar responsibility. Indeed, the
federal statute books are planted thick with statutes that attempt to
mitigate agency tunnel vision or mission orientation by requiring that
agencies consider a broad range of social goals that are not directly
within their charge. Virtually every agency has a manual,2 0 outlining the
24 See Larry D. Kramer, 'Foreword: We the Court' (2001) 115 Harv.L.Rev. 4 at 123-8,
165-8.
25 Indeed, the Supreme Court may sometimes do the agency'sjob for it by finding specific
hearing requirements in a statute that entirely fails to mention them. See Califano v.
Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 at 706 (1979).
26 Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
27 See generally Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1982).
28 See generally Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1986).
29 See, e.g., US Department of Agriculture, 'Departmental Manual Number 1260-001,'
online: USDA<http://www.usda.gov/ocio/directives/DM/DM1260-001.htm>; Internal
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procedures for administrative rule making, that requires agency person-
nel to (for example) consider and implement cross-cutting statutes such
as the National Environmental Policy Act, the Regulatory Flexibility Act,
and the Paperwork Reduction Act. Indeed, there are so many such
requirements that they may be an important contributing cause to the
perceived stagnation of federal agency regulatory processes.,
But these 'framework' statutes are directed specifically at agency
action. Compliance with their requirements is a minimum or core duty of
'faithful agency.' Considering the whole of the legal topography, by
contrast, is quite another matter. If we believe with Alexander Hamilton
3 1
that the executive branch is meant to give energy to governance, we may
also believe that an agency interpretive posture that seeks to harmonize
its actions with the whole of the legal order risks forgetting that agencies
are created precisely to carry out special-purpose missions. Other legal
institutions have responsibilities for coherence and balance. Indeed, the
sharing of these constitutional responsibilities among Congress, the
president, and the courts is part of the justification for assuring that
administrators are answerable to all of them. Here, as in our discussion of
direct agency implementation of constitutional norms, agencies must
balance their more remote responsibilities as contributors to the unity of
the legal order - and hence to the operational feasibility of the rule of
law - with their more proximate and primary responsibilities to the
development of one segment of it.
To put this point in a slightly different way, Jonathan Siegel has
argued that courts construe agency statutes against the background of
quasi-constitutional administrative law norms. 32 Indeed, the particulari-
ties of agency statutes may be all but indistinguishable against an admin-
istrative law background that has occupied much of the interpretive
foreground as well. But how much attention should the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) pay to the background norms of administrative
law as opposed to the background norms of environmental law? And, as
a practical matter, is there any reason to believe that that agency would
be expert in the former rather than the latter? The examples can, of
Revenue Service, 'IRS Chief Counsel Advice Training Materials' (Fall 2000), online: IRS
<http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/cca-trngl.pdf>; Food and Drug Administration, 'FDA
Manual of Regulatory Standard Operating Procedures and Policies' (7 April 2002),
online: <http://www.fda.gov/cber/regsopp/regsopp.htm>.
30 See Mashaw et at., Administrative Law, supra note 17 at 604-10, and authorities there
discussed.
31 See Alexander Hamilton, 'The Federalist No. 70' in Clinton Rossiter, ed., The Federalist
Papers (New York: New American Library, 1961) 423 ('Energy in the executive is a
leading character in the definition of good government.')
32 See generallyjonathan R. Siegel, 'Textualism and Contextualism in Administrative Law'
(1998) 78 B.U.L.Rev. 1023.
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course, be multiplied, and some eminent scholars have wondered in
print whether the normative context that Siegel emphasizes actually
exists as a distinct field.33 The difference this can make is obvious to
administrative lawyers in those instances where the judiciary seems to
switch its background context from general administrative law to field-
specific norms. I suspect that most American administrative law profes-
sors, for example, explain Morton v. Ruiz?4 to their students as an 'Indian
Law' case and also bracket the tax cases in the standing jurisprudence 35
as responding to the peculiar hesitancy of American federal courts to
permit the litigation of 'other people's tax liability.'
Agencies' special relationship to Congress also affects how they
interpret. In recent years, much controversy about statutory interpreta-
tion has centred on the evidentiary materials that should be relevant to
the judicial task. Textualists are at war with purposivists; plain-language
advocates joust with those prepared to seek meaning in legislative
history.36 But whatever one thinks ofjudicial use of non-statutory legisla-
tive material, Peter Strauss has argued persuasively that these materials
are critical to the interpretive task of agencies.3 7 Although Strauss does
not put the argument precisely in 'faithful agent' terms, his basic case is
that agencies have a direct relationship with Congress that gives them
insights into legislative purposes and meaning that are likely to be much
more sure-footed than those available to courts in episodic litigation. For
a faithful agent to forget this content, to, in some sense, ignore its
institutional memory, would be to divest itself of critical resources in
carrying out congressional designs.
Perhaps even more importantly, in Strauss's view, the loss of these
resources would be devastating to agency defence of statutory integrity
against the pressures of subsequent political coalitions. Statutes persist
while presidents and congresses .change. In this context, the agency
becomes the guardian or custodian of the legislative scheme as enacted.
If we believe that agencies are meant to implement the statute, not the
preferences of sitting presidents or senators or representatives, then to
33 See, e.g., Ernest Gelihorn & Glen 0. Robinson, 'Perspectives on Administrative Law'
(1975) 75 Colum.L.Rev. 771.
34 415 U.S. 199 (1974).
35 E.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984); Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights
Organization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
36 For a comprehensive discussion assessing the propriety of interpreting statutes through
their legislative history, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Philip P. Frickey, Legislation:
Statutes and the Creation of Public Policy, 2d ed.(St. Paul, MN: West Group, 1995) at
748-832.
37 See Strauss, 'When the Judge,' supra note 5. The argument is further elaborated in
John C. Roberts, 'Are Congressional Committees Constitutional?: Radical Textualism,
Separation of Powers and the Enactment Process' (2001) 52 Case W.Res.L.Rev. 489 at
561.
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denude them of the use of legislative history as a defence against contem-
porary political importuning is to leave the statutory custodians naked
before their enemies.
Hence, even if you think, as I do, that the use of legislative history has
no constitutional consequences for courts - that is, that there is no
constitutional basis for either restricting or requiring the use of legislative
history as a guide to a statutory meaning - one might take a different
view with respect to agencies. Not only might they, as a prudential matter,
have a better chance of understanding the real political context only
partially revealed by legislative history as argued to courts in litigation,
they might need to wrap themselves tightly in the blanket of pre-legisla-
tive congressional utterances in order to maintain the integrity of the
statutory scheme in the face of powerful political controllers intent on
wrenching statutory schemes loose from their historical, contextual foun-
dations. In some instances only the skilful deployment of legislative
history will permit agencies to fulfil their constitutional role as faithful
agents in the statute's implementation.
Yet one wonders how far to push this position. As I have argued
elsewhere, 8 legislative history is almost always more specific than statu-
tory language. The concrete and particularized problems memorialized-
in congressional hearings and reports usually give rise to generalized
legislative responses. If legislative history is anecdotal, statutory language
may approach the Delphic. The suggestion that the use of legislative
history defends statutory integrity begs the question of what integrity
means when implementing statutory terms whose breadth allows (and
perhaps anticipates) development and reorientation.39
Indeed, to the extent that we believe that agencies should be subject
to presidential direction in shaping statutory meaning, we commit
ourselves to a form of dynamic interpretation that downplays the rele-
vance of the original context of statutory enactments. Nor are presidents
the only ones who engage in post-enactment political activity relevant to
statutory implementation. Congress also subjects agencies to oversight of
their implementing activity. Agencies consult with Congress continually
about proposals relevant to their jurisdictions. They appear before con-
gressional appropriations committees that often have strong views about
the directions that agency implementation should take. If it is the immer-
sion of agencies in this continuous interaction with both executive
38 See generally Mashaw, 'Textualism,' supra note 12.
39 Einer Elhauge argues, for example, that enacting congresses would prefer
interpretation that conforms to present 'enactable' political preferences because, given
the existing inventory of past enactments, that approach gives maximum authority to
sitting congresses in all time periods. Einer Elhauge, 'Preference-Estimating Statutory
Default Rules' (2002) 102 Colum.L.Rev. 2027. Why those preferences should be
constitutionally controlling is left unexplained.
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branch offices and sub-parts of Congress that provides us with constitu-
tional security concerning the political accountability of our administra-
tive institutions, should not all of this political context be constitutionally
relevant to administrators when they ponder the appropriate interpreta-
tion of their statutory mandates?
To put the matter slightly differently, one can understand the judi-
ciary's constitutional qualms about using non-enacted legislative materi-
als - particularly post-enactment congressional activities not leading to
subsequent legislation - as a basis for interpretation.4 ° If courts are to
maintain their independent status as both defenders and declarers of
'the law,' they risk at least the appearance of illegitimacy when they
immerse themselves in the politics of legislative enactment and, particu-
larly, in the politics of post-enactment implementation. Therein lies, I
take it, one strategic constitutional underpinning for the Chevron doc-
trine. If courts are to act as faithful agents and yet avoid immersing
themselves in contemporary political processes, one way to go about it is
to give discretion to those who cannot avoid it.
But these considerations suggest that whatever constitutional scruples
there may be aboutjudicial use of evidence bearing on political struggles
.and political context, agencies' use of this 'political' material is a part of
maintaining their democratic legitimacy. It is precisely theirjob as agents
of past congresses and sitting politicians to synthesize the past with the
present.4
Other structural aspects of agencies' constitutional position point in
the same direction. Agencies are not passive interpreters dependent
upon discrete occasions of adversarial contest to present them with
interpretive choices. They are, instead, active implementers who are
expected to pick and choose their occasions for interpretation and the
forms those interpretive utterances will take. Agency control of what
might be called its 'interpretative agenda' argues for an interpretative
approach that engages a wider-ranging set of policy considerations and a
more straightforward attention to political context than would be
constitutionally appropriate for the judiciary.
Moreover, in many situations agencies have clear law-making author-
ity. They are the implementers of non-self-executing legislation, laws that
are not capable of application as rules of conduct until the agency gives
them meaning by adopting binding interpretations. Here again the
40 In situations where these materials are unusually persuasive, those qualms may be
overcome. See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Wlliamson Tobacco, 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
41 Edward L. Rubin, 'Dynamic Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State' in
Philip Frickey, ed., Issues in Legal Scholarship: Dynamic Statutory Interpretation (Berkeley,
CA: Berkeley Electronic Press, 2002), online: Berkeley Electronic Press <http://
www.bepress.com/ils/iss3/art2/>.
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Chevron doctrine recognizes a convergence of interpretation and policy
making that both counsels judicial caution and establishes administrative
responsibility. As a part of the Court's Chevron opinion put it, the combi-
nation of law-making and interpretive responsibility in administrative
institutions is constitutionally appropriate because it can be directed,
checked, and controlled by the political branches.
Consider finally the matter of the constitutional status of judicial
precedent. Ajudicial interpretation ignoring prior authoritative interpre-
tations of higher courts would be considered constitutionally illegitimate
and deeply inappropriate almost anywhere. Yet there are numerous
instances where non-acquiescence in judicial constructions may be
necessary for the proper exercise of an agency's constitutional mandate.
Federal agencies administer national programs but are reviewed by
federal courts whose jurisdictions are limited to particular districts or
circuits. Only the Supreme Court has a national jurisdiction matching
that of most federal agencies. Agencies such as the Social Security
Administration, the EPA, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), and
the IRS routinely confront conflicting interpretations of their statutes by
district and circuit judges in different parts of the country. In these
situations there is no consistent judicial precedent to follow.
But the situation is more subtle and more interesting than conflicts
among district or circuit courts that make following judicial precedent
impossible in a national program. 42 In the United States, the constitu-
tional legitimacy ofjudicial construction of federal statute arises from the
court's constitutional mandate to decide cases or controversies. While
federal courts 'declare what the law is,' they do so only in concrete cases.
These interpretations become 'the law of the case.' They are binding on
the litigants in that case and on inferior courts subject to the reviewing
jurisdiction of the court rendering the interpretive opinion.
But agencies are not inferior courts. They are a part of the executive
branch. Hence, a court ruling is binding on the agency in the litigated
case but, as a technical legal matter, not otherwise. The agency is legally
free to maintain its prior position and litigate the matter further. Amer-
ican administrative agencies have often refused to acquiesce in reviewing
court determinations and have adopted varying positions on how to man-
age their conflict with the courts pending a final resolution of the matter.
Most lawyers would probably subscribe to the notion that a Supreme
Court determination would provide such a final resolution. But even that
42 See Samuel Estreicher & Richard Revesz, 'Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative
Agencies' (1989) 98 Yale L.J. 679; Samuel Estreicher & Richard Revesz, 'The Uneasy
Case against Intracircuit Nonacquiescence: A Reply' (1990) 99 Yale L.J. 831. But see
Matthew Dillar, 'Intracircuit Nonacquiescence and the Breakdown of the Rule of Law:
A Response to Estreicher and Revesz' (1990) 99 Yale L.J. 801.
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question is not entirely free from doubt.4 3 The Supreme Court's power to
resolve a conflict among the circuits is not the same as a power to resolve
the interpretive question for the other branches of the government. As a
practical matter, of course, agencies are unwilling to flout Supreme
Court decisions, and even district court interpretations of their statutes
may have binding nationwide effect when the review proceeding involves
a general regulation. Indeed, simply as the law of the case, an injunction
preventing an agency from implementing a regulation has nationwide
force. But apart from these circumstances, federal agencies have been
directed to implement nationally uniform programs. Program variation
based on local judicial rulings, rather than on some statutorily relevant
differences in local contexts, is not a part of the congressional scheme
that has been put in their charge.
This is not the place to rehearse the subtleties of the question of
agency non-acquiescence. The point is simply that, as a structural con-
stitutional matter,judicial precedent looks different as a source of either
binding or persuasive evidence for agency interpretations of statutory
terms. Indeed, given the context of mostjudicial constructions of agency
statutes - the review of some prior action of the agency - it is often
unclear what binding force the judicial interpretation was meant to have
for future policy. A determination that the agency's interpretation was
impermissible is not the same thing as a finding that there is a judicial
interpretation providing the only correct way to understand the statute."
And a substantial portion of court-agency interpretive disagreement is
glossed over by the ubiquitous practice of remanding for a further arti-
culation of an agency's reasons.
43 For a flavour of this debate, consult H.Jefferson Powell, The Constitution and the Attorneys
General (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 1999); Lawrence H. Tribe, American
Constitutional Law, 3d ed. (New York: Foundation Press, 2000) vol. 1 at 264-7; Larry
Alexander & Frederick Schauer, 'On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation' (1997)
110 Harv.L.Rev. 1359; Christopher L. Eisgruber, 'The Most Competent Branches: A
Response to Professor Paulsen' (1994) 83 Georget.L.J. 347;John Harrison, 'The Role
of the Legislative and Executive Branches in Interpreting the Constitution' (1988) 73
Cornell L.Rev. 371; Sanford Levinson, 'Constitutional Protestantism in Theory and
Practice: Two Questions for Michael Stokes Paulsen and One for His Critics' (1994) 83
Georget.L.J. 373; Michael Stokes Paulsen, 'The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive
Power to Say What the Law Is' (1994) 83 Georget.L.J. 217; Symposium, 'Elected Branch
Influences in Constitutional Decisionmaking' (1993) 56 Law & Contemp.Probs. 1;
Symposium, 'Executive Branch Interpretation of the Law' (1993) 15 Cardozo L.Rev. 21.
44 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947). See Kenneth A. Bamberger, 'Provisional
Precedent: Reestablishing the Primacy of Agency Constructions of Administrative
Statutes' (2002) 77 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 272 (arguing that agencies should treat judicial
interpretations of their statutes as provisional precedent until such time as the agency
has a chance to visit or revisit the question).
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The preceding paragraphs probably only scratch the surface of the
interpretive problems that take on a distinctive flavour when approached
from an administrative rather than a judicial perspective. The US Su-
preme Court's recently rejuvenated concern to interpret statutes to pro-
tect state prerogatives4 5 from congressional suppression via the Com-
merce Clause, for example, might look quite bizarre to the many agen-
cies whose statutes place them in state-federal partnerships46 that
presume a collaborative exercise of power rather than a clear structural
division of jurisdiction. Within these programs of 'cooperative federal-
ism,' both state and federal 'prerogatives' emerge from the practical
necessities of ongoing, statutorily mandated joint ventures, not from
constitutionally embedded presumptions or default rules. Indeed, the
whole idea of 'clear statement' principles when dealing with intergovern-
mental affairs may seem quite preposterous from an agency, or from the
congressional, perspective.47 Again, examples could be multiplied, but
enough has been said to illustrate the central idea.
B PRUDENTIAL CONSIDERATIONS
Virtually any argument about interpretive methodology relies on a vision
of the legal order shaped by the Constitution and the interpreter's place
in that legal order. Pressed hard enough, any interpretive approach
based on 'prudence' or 'good practice' will be found to have its under-
pinnings rooted in some vision of the constitutional order. Yet, in the
judicial context, there are surely common methodological commitments
that seem to be largely prudential.
One may be unconvinced, as I am, by the constitutional arguments
put forward for the proposition that courts should ignore legislative
history. Yet there is certainly something to the notion that 'rummaging
about' in legislative history materials can be misleading as well as enlight-
ening. And one might think that legislative history has a particular
capacity to mislead when presented to courts in adversary litigation.
Caught in adversarial verbal crossfire, and largely excluded from inde-
pendent exposure to the legislative context, courts may have strong
prudential reasons to doubt their capacity to separate the wheat from the
chaff when exposed to pre-enactment legislative materials.
45 E.g., Solid Waste Agency v. US Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
46 Descriptions of many of these partnerships can be found in the Green Book. See U.S.,
Staff of House Committee on Ways and Means, 106th Cong., 2000 Green Book:
Background Material and Data on Programs Within the Jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways
and Means, Committee Print (2000).
47 For a classic description of the subdeties of cooperative federalism, see Martha
Derthick, Influence of Federal Grants (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970).
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Similarly, one might be unconvinced that the canon counselling
courts to construe statutes in ways that avoid constitutional questions has
any firm basis in the separation of powers. But it is surely the case that
judicial political capital is not infinite. Courts that routinely strike down
legislative enactments might quickly lose favour with the body politic, not
just with the legislature. A prudent court should conserve judicial
political capital, as Alex Bickel famously argued.48
Nor are courts above construing statutes in ways that enhance judicial
effectiveness as an independent prudential or bureaucratic concern.
When the Supreme Court said in the famous NLRB v. Hearst Publications49
case that the meaning of the word 'employee' in the National Labor
Relations Act 50 was to be treated as a 'fact' within the experience of a
NLRB, it affirmed the power of Congress to confer significant interpreta-
tive authority on the NLRB. It also protected the federal judiciary from
thousands of essentially fact-based appeals that would have swamped the
federal district courts. And when it interpreted the federal Administrative
Procedure Act 51 as a barrier to the creation of novel procedural require-
ments by federal circuit courts,5 2 it may have done more to maintain its
authority over the federal circuits than it did to elaborate a proper
understanding of the reach of the APA.
53
Prudential approaches to statutory interpretation, as the concerns just
discussed illustrate, seem to have three major purposes: (1) increasing
the interpreter's capacity to avoid error, (2) increasing or maintaining
the legitimacy of the interpreter as an interpreter, and (3) enhancing the
interpreter's capacity to make its interpretations effective. All of these
prudential considerations are relevant with respect to agency interpreta-
tion of statutes as well. They simply may press an agency in slightly
different directions.
For example, an agency that has been heavily involved in the negotia-
tion of statutory language, has been privy to both formal and informal
legislative debates, and is cognizant of the multiple motives that have
prompted particular legislative utterances, may feel that its capacity to
avoid error in statutory interpretation is enormously advanced by its use
of pre- and even post-enactment legislative history. Indeed, American
reviewing courts recognized this special competence by giving agency
48 See generallyAlexander Bickel, TheLeastDangerous Branch (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill,
1962).
49 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
50 29 U.S.C. § 452 (2005).
51 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (2005).
52 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519
(1978).
53 See Nathaniel L. Nathanson, 'The Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Opinion: A
Masterpiece of Statutory Misinterpretation' (1979) 16 San Diego L.Rev. 183.
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interpretations what is now called 'Skidmore deference' long before
Chevron.
As a prudential (perhaps even constitutional) matter, courts and
agencies might also have different approaches to interpretive decision
making under uncertainty. The question when interpreting is often not
just how to avoid error but in what direction to skew errors given irresolv-
able interpretive uncertainty. Cass Sunstein has suggested, for example,
that courts might properly skew their interpretive utterances in the
direction of enforcing otherwise under-enforced constitutional norms.
54
This argument may or may not be persuasive in the judicial context, but
it is surely less persuasive for administrators. In the American constitu-
tional machine, which does not quite 'run of itself,' courts have long
been viewed as rights-protecting institutional brakes, while executive
departments and administrative agencies are institutional accelerators. A
prudent court may say to itself, 'When in doubt, protect the constitu-
tional commitment to a government of limited powers.' A prudent
administrator might be better advised to adopt this counsel: 'When in
doubt, make the statutory scheme effective.' Here, of course, the pruden-
tial rules edge very close to convergence with constitutional scruples.
When asked why these divergent presumptions are appealing, one would
have difficulty in constructing an answer that did not implicate a particu-
lar vision of constitutional structure.
Similar differences emerge when we consider howjudicial and admin-
istrative interpreters might conserve or enhance their perceived legiti-
macy. While Bickel may have oversold the 'passive virtues,' judicial legi-
timacy is more often called into question by activism than by avoidance.
(I assume that Bush v. Gore5 is leaping unbidden into your mind). Almost
the opposite might be true for administrators. Hyperactive administrators
can be reined in by legal and political controls. By contrast, stodgy
bureaucracies are hard to get moving: legal controls on agency inaction
are weak, and congressional clear statements and deadlines tend to
undermine precisely the exercise of informed discretion that statutory
delegations to administrative agencies are meant to provide.
We tend to admire and reward agencies that are evidently doing their
jobs. By contrast, agencies that fail to give needed interpretive guidance,
are unresponsive to new issues by requiring reinterpretation of statutory
terms, and leave potential statutoryjurisdiction undeveloped are likely to
be viewed as ineffective and, to that degree, illegitimate.56 Hence, when
54 See Cass Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution: Reconceiving the Regulatory State (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1990).
55 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
56 Daniel Carpenter has argued persuasively that politically effective agencies can gain a
species of legitimacy that makes them essentially impervious to political control by
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choosing occasions for interpretation, agencies may well have an inter-
pretive predisposition to elaborate their statutes as fully as possible. This
not only gives guidance to affected parties, it gets the agency'sjob done.
The proactive administrative interpreter may gain both prestige and
legitimacy in administrative domains where efficacy is legitimacy's crucial
metric. 'Activist court' is, by contrast, seldom a term of approbation.
More controversially, the prudent American administrative agency
may also seek political capital by constant attention to the preferences of
the president and Congress. Not only does Congress control the agency's
budget (with additional control being exerted by the president via the
Office of Management and Budget), but the Justice Department (under
presidential direction) controls the agency's litigating authority. In this
political context, an agency that wants to be effective in its overall
program would often do well to avoid battles with its political controllers
on issues about which those controllers have strong views. A prudent
agency will almost certainly allow current politics to guide not only its
interpretive agenda but sometimes the interpretations themselves.
To be sure, we expect some autonomy from agencies, some fidelity to
statutes and programs that outruns the political preferences of current
office holders. But, if we expect agencies to be effective, we also expect
them to be politically sensitive. Such prudential advice would seem odd if
given to a court. The judiciary must maintain its political capital in some
macro-political sense.5 7 But the court that trims interpretation to current
political fashion will be thought irresponsible, not prudent.
The agency that takes current political preferences into account in its
interpretations risks irresponsibility as well. But agencies have much
larger tool kits with which to shape opinion, test political waters, and
negotiate accommodations than do the courts. Agencies can float trial
balloons in 'policy statements' or 'Advanced Notices of Proposed
Rulemaking.' They can create the groundwork for interpretive innova-
tion through factual inquiry and by cultivating allies both inside and
outside the political branches. Agency interpretations are not all-or-
nothing or one-time things. Bending with the political winds can end up
as political jujitsu that legitimizes agency interpretive positions in the
long run, notwithstanding the preferences of either presidents or
congresses.5"
either the president or the Congress. These 'hyper-legitimate' agencies become, at least
for a while, politically autonomous. See generally Daniel P. Carpenter, The Forging of
Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies,
1862-1928 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001) [Forging Bureaucratic
Autonomy].
57 See Harry H. Wellington, 'The Nature ofJudicial Review' (1982) 91 Yale LJ. 486.
58 See Carpenter, Forging Bureaucratic Autonomy, supra note 56.
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The basic point is that agency interpretation is a part of agency policy
development, and the development of legitimate policy flows from the
prudent exercise of a wide range of administrative capacities. Administra-
tion is notjust a question of exercising authoritative jurisdiction within a
hierarchical system of political and legal accountability.
Finally, agencies may have much more reason than courts to look at
interpretation from the perspective of internal bureaucratic or hierarchi-
cal control. If the us Social Security Administration, for example, is going
to regulate the interpretive discretion of approximately 10 000 state
agency personnel and 1 100 administrative law judges in the determina-
tion of disability benefits, it had better have some hard-edged regulatory
policy interpreting the extremely broad language of the Social Security
Act. By providing hard edges the Social Security Administration neces-
sarily gives up nuance and texture. Its regulations disable contextual
interpretive discretion by individual deciders in order to maintain some
consistency in a nationwide program.
Similar considerations affect all agencies with broad mandates and
'mass justice' adjudicatory responsibilities. 'Rulishness' may not make a
statute 'the best that it can be,'59 but it guards against the best defeating
the good. Obviously, courts too are influenced by needs for hierarchical
control- over lower court judgments.60 But this is not an ever-present
prudential concern for courts as it is for administrators. Courts can strive
for the 'best' interpretation with less risk that they will thereby drive out
'good.'6
Agencies can also more easily avoid interpretive closure when that
approach seems to enhance effectiveness. For example, the NLRB has
long maintained, critical commentary notwithstanding,62 that the varied
contexts of labour disputes make hard-edged interpretation of the
National Labor Relations Act an imprudent administrative technique.
The board has, therefore, allowed its rule-making powers to atrophy and
has only rarely developed 'per se' rules in adjudication. The NLRB seems to
believe that, in its particular political context, to act like an arbitrator
59 This is Ronald Dworkin's formulation of the goal ofjudicial statutory interpretation. See
Dworkin, Law's Empire, supra note 28.
60 See the discussion of the Supreme Court's regulatory difficulties in Peter Strauss, 'One-
Hundred Fifty Cases per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited
Resources forJudicial Review of Agency Action' (1987) 87 Colum.L.Rev. 1093.
61 This risk, of course, provides fodder for many a dissenting opinion. See, e.g., Mead Corp.,
supra note 14 at 239 (ScaliaJ. dissenting); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 at 517 (1978)
(RehnquistJ. dissenting).
62 See, e.g., Merton Bernstein, 'The NLRB's Adjudication-Rulemaking Dilemma Under the
Administrative Procedure Act' (1970) 79 Yale L.J. 571. See also Julius G. Getman,
Stephen B. Goldberg, & Jeanne B. Herman, Union Representation Elections: Law and
Reality (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1976).
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operating under vague statutory standards is the best way to maintain the
legitimacy and effectiveness of its essentially conflict-resolving role. If the
lack of rules and clear precedent allows geographic variation in labour
law, that may be politic in a field marked by fierce ideological conflict
and significant regional variation in public support for the rights of both
labour and management.
To be sure, courts also engage in strategic manipulation of their
interpretive agendas. But their techniques of both avoidance and activ-
ism are feeble by comparison with those of most administrative agencies.
And, given the courts' duty to resolve conflicts properly before them,
their strategic concerns are both secondary to their primary function and
focused almost exclusively on maintaining authoritative conflict-resolving
capacity. Agencies, by contrast, are implementers of programs whose
success or failure may depend less on the persuasiveness of any particular
instance of statutory construction than on how they order and imple-
ment their interpretive agendas.
C SUMMING UP
There is - I hope - much to quarrel with and argue about in the preced-
ing discussion. The categories of 'Constitutional Demands' and 'Pruden-
tial Concerns' are overlapping, perhaps coterminous. My discussion is
deliberately vague about what is in fact 'demanded' by a 'Constitutional
Demand.' My understanding of the responsibilities devolving upon
administrators and courts by virtue of our constitutional structure is
deeply controversial. I have failed to articulate and defend any particular
methodology of statutory interpretation for administrators. The set of
both constitutional and prudential considerations that I have invoked is
surely incomplete. So be it.
The point of the discussion is to begin to frame a missing debate and
to convince you that there is an interesting and important subject,
'Agency Statutory Interpretation,' that needs attention. The framing task
has been approached by comparing and contrasting a legally familiar
practice, judicial interpretation of statutes, with a ubiquitous but never-
theless unfamiliar one, administrative interpretation. From that discus-
sion it seems fair to conclude that judges and administrators interpret -
indeed, should interpret - within divergent normative contexts. A set of
'Canons of Responsible Interpretive Practice' would look different if
addressed to administrators than if addressed tojudges. Table 1 suggests,
in an oversimplified bipolar fashion, the likely acceptance or rejection of
a series of canons of construction that might be addressed to both groups
of interpreters.
Like most canons of professional responsibility, these statements
would need commentary, qualification, and example to provide anything
like a workable guide. Many more canons are needed for a complete set
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TABLE 1
Canons for institutionally responsible statutory interpretation
Agency Court
1. Follow presidential directions unless clearly outside your
authority. +*
2. Interpret to avoid raisingconstitutional questions. - +
3. Use legislative history as a primary interpretive guide. + -
4. Interpret to give energy and breadth to all legislative programs
within your jurisdiction. + -
5. Engage in activist law-making. + -
6. Respect all judicial precedent. - +
7. Interpret to lend coherence to the overall legal order. - +
8. Pay particular attention to the strategic parameters of
interpretive efficiency. + -
9. Interpret to insure hierarchical control over subordinates. + -
10. Pay constant attention to your contemporary political milieu. +
* '+' means appropriate, '-' inappropriate. Given my discussion, many of these notations
might realistically be more nuanced - '++' or '+/-' or even '+/?', for example.
for either institution. The canons need tweaking to reflect the complex-
ity of cross-cutting demands. Indeed, I am extremely sceptical of attempts
to use canonized rules for interpretation as a means of establishing
responsible interpretative practice.6 3
Table l's purpose is only to suggest how starkly the normative institu-
tional presuppositions of administrative andjudicial interpretation might
diverge. And if that is true, in an ubiquitously administrative state,
debating interpretive method from a relentlesslyjudiciocentric perspec-
tive misses a lot of the action. Moreover, normative divergence casts new
light on the much-rehearsed question of agency-court interpretive power
sharing. Our governmental powers are not just separated, they are
distinct. They respond to different normative perspectives. If both
agencies and courts are doing their proper interpretive jobs, it would
appear that they should constantly disagree about interpretative method
and, if method matters, about meaning.
This recognition raises quite fundamental questions about judicial
deference to agency interpretive discretion - indeed, about the concep-
tion of law that should be in Play when interpretive methodology is
debated or chosen. For example, can it possibly be deferential for courts
to use, as the Supreme Court has said, 'ordinary techniques of statutory
63 For an argument that this would be constitutionally permissible for Congress with
respect to courts, although without a demonstration that it would be feasible, see
Rosenkranz, 'Federal Rules,' supra note 12. That Congress has often debated this
matter, at least in the context ofjudicial review of agency interpretation, and has been
unable to agree on the appropriate formulation of interpretive principles, suggests that
feasibility may be the sticking point. See Burge, 'Regulatory Reform,' supra note 5.
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interpretation,' meaning surely 'ordinary techniques ofjudicial statutory
interpretation,' when reviewing the correctness or the reasonableness of
agency statutory interpretations that almost certainly employ 'ordinary
techniques of agency statutory interpretation'? If not, is this implicit non-
deference normativelyjustifiable? Constitutionally required?
Even more fundamentally, do we not need to explore more carefully
Ed Rubin's argument 64 that 'law' in the federal administrative state is
fundamentally about empowering and instructing administrative officials,
not about prescribing rules of conduct? From this perspective, should we
not imagine agency statutes as works in progress, to be shaped and
moulded by continuous interaction among the implementing agency,
the political branches, and affected interests? And, if that is true, then do
we not need to ratchet up the authoritative interpretive role of agencies,
the president, and Congress in the ongoing process of agency, implemen-
tation? To put the matter in an extreme form, why should our under-
standing of the 'rule of law' when dealing with agency implementation
imagine more than a minor or marginal place forjudicial interpretation?
Why should an agency's interpretive legitimacy - our reasons for finding
its actions politically acceptable - have much of anything to do with
whether courts agree with the meaning it gives to statutes?
These questions obviously implicate our most basic understandings of
the rule of law in an administrative state. And they lead off into deep and
complex questions of the role of legal accountability in legal legitimacy -
questions similar to those Larry Kramer has so trenchantly raised with
respect to the evolution ofjudicial review and the increasingly monopo-
listic hold of the federal courts on constitutional meaning.65
As I said early on, these are also questions that are consistently raised
byJohn Willis's administrative law scholarship. Yet, so far as I can discern,
Willis never gave a definitive answer himself. He argued strenuously
against a facile understanding of the rule of law as the rule of courts. And
he pointed out the numerous ways in which courts inserted themselves
into administrative business where they arguably have no jurisdiction to
intrude.66 Yet he never firmly rejected the presumption of reviewability of
64 See Rubin, 'Law and Legislation,' supra note 5.
65 See generally Kramer, 'Foreword: We the Court,' supra note 24. See also Edward L.
Rubin, 'Getting Beyond Democracy' (2001) 149 U.Pa.L.Rev. 711 (arguing that
participation within administrative processes should have as much claim to satisfying
democratic ideals as the capacity of voters or elected representatives to hold
administrators accountable).
66 In addition to works previously cited, these matters are perceived in John Willis,
'Administrative Law and the British North America Act' (1939) 53 Harv.L.Rev. 251;
John Willis, 'The Delegation of Legislative andJudicial Powers to Administrative Bodies:
A Study of the Report of the Committee on Ministers' Powers' (1932) 18 Iowa L.Rev.
150; andJohn Willis, 'Canadian Administrative Law' (1961) 6J.S.P.T.L. 53.
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administrative action.6 7 That would, perhaps, be much too general a
principle for a scholar who believed deeply in the force of contextual
understanding as a guide to appropriate legal resolution.
At a general level, the proper roles of administrators and courts in
moulding the law cannot be cogently specified. Some balance between
general and special law perspectives is required. We 'agency' or 'govern-
ment' men (and women) will continue to think that the balance is tilted
too far in the direction of judicial theologists. And those who preach
from the opposing pulpit will continue to see the glaring dangers of
agency autonomy. In that struggle, a balance will be achieved. Whether it
is the right one is perhaps unknowable.
III Interpretive practice
AsJohn Willis would surely remind us, the proper balance in any particu-
lar context should depend upon what we take agency practice to be.
What are agencies actually doing? And who is being hurt or helped by
their interpretive activities or practices? In short, how do administrators
go about the business of statutory interpretation? That question has two
related parts: (1) What are the occasions, forms, and processes for agency
statutory interpretation? (2) How do administrators interpret; that is,
what is their interpretive methodology?
The first issue requires scrutiny in part because both courts68 and
commentators6 9 have argued that the occasion, form, and process for
agency statutory interpretation bear directly on the respect that courts
should give to agency determinations of statutory meaning. These argu-
ments presume, to a greater or lesser degree, that occasion, form, and
process are probative both about whether an agency is exercising authori-
tative law-making power when interpreting a statute and about the
degree to which the agency's views are 'well considered' and, therefore,
highly persuasive if not authoritative. Are these presumptions correct?
67 Willis agreed explicitly with Peter Hogg's statement that in reviewing the question of
whether a statute 'will reasonably bear the meaning which its administrator has placed
upon it,' a reasonable court 'must ... weigh the official perception of the needs of
effective government against the general values of civil liberty which are asserted by the
individual affected.' But he deeply doubted Hogg's conclusion that Canadian courts
had by and large been restrained in the exercise of their judicial review function. As
Willis puts it, '[M]y impression, and it is only an impression, is that the courts have
always been, and still are, far too ready to impose on twentieth-century collectivist
agencies, in the name of what Professor Hogg calls "general values which were
fundamental to the legal order as a whole," individualist values whose sole claim to
validity is that they are lawyers' values based, as lawyers' values always are, on a long-
dead eighteenth-century past.' Willis, 'Retrospect,' supra note 1 at 244-5.
68 Mead Corp., supra note 14.
69 See, e.g., Robert A. Anthony, 'Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and
the Courts?' (1990) 7 YaleJ.Reg. 1.
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These issues also bear examination in their own right. We know the
answer to occasion, form, and process questions when considering
judicial interpretation of statutes. The occasion is a lawsuit. The form of
interpretation is ajudicial opinion rationalizing the court's resolution of
the lawsuit. The process is the conventional judicial process of adversary
argument followed by independent judicial consideration.
Agency interpretations, by contrast, take myriad forms: legislative
rules, interpretative rules, statements of policy, manual issuances, advi-
sory opinions, letters, press releases, after-dinner speeches, formal adju-
dications, informal adjudications, interpretive memoranda, guidelines,
'rulings,' and so on, and so on. The occasions for interpretation are not
just disputes but queries, political provocations, and autonomous policy
decisions. And the process through which interpretations are formulated
varies with the occasion for interpretation and the form in which it will or
must be rendered. It would be surprising for agency interpretive method-
ology to be invariant across these differing contexts (although it may be).
Hence, if we are to understand 'how,' we must extend our interest to
'when,' 'what,' and 'through what process.'
These contextual considerations complicate matters considerably. We
build our understandings of judicial interpretive method from reading
and analysing judicial opinions. Some opinions self-consciously address
issues of method; in others we can merely observe and catalogue practice.
But the critical feature of (published) judicial opinions is that method is
observable. Judicial explanation is, of course, always partial, sometimes
strategic, perhaps often myopic about the judges' own mental processes.
But, accepting these irremediable limitations, the materials for descrip-
tive analysis ofjudicial interpretive methodology are not elusive.
Not so with agencies. When agencies issue orders in formal adjudica-
tory proceedings or providing supporting rationales for published rules,
their interpretive method may be both as transparent and as irreducibly
opaque as judicial methodology. But when speaking interpretively in
other forms, administrators often have less need to explain themselves
and no need to formalize, preserve, or make available sources from which
we might glean their methodological commitments. Remember that now-
hoary chestnut, the Overton Park7 ° case. The Federal Highway Administra-
tion's interpretation of 'feasible and prudent alternative' was critically at
issue, but its approach was buried under tons of informal record keeping
and obscured by years of intergovernmental negotiations. Yet, as Strauss's
splendid reconstruction of the events leading up to the litigation
reveals,7' it would be hard to say that the administration did not have a
70 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
71 Peter Strauss, 'Revisiting Overton Park Political andJudicial Controls over Administrative
Actions Affecting the Community' (1992) 39 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 1251.
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sophisticated understanding of its statutory scheme, one whose subtle
trade-offs between engineering, environmental, social, economic, and
political concerns would be almost impossible to recapture for purposes
of examination and review.
Agency manuals, to take another example, are chock full of interpre-
tive prescriptions directed to lower-level or field personnel. But agency
executives have little reason here to give reasons for their pronounce-
ments. The audience is lower-level personnel; that agency superiors have
said 'do it this way' is enough. Explanation may come in 'field letters' or
training sessions. But both of these types of explanations are likely to be
couched in operational, not abstract, interpretive language, and the
substance of the latter will not be reliably recoverable at all. This is
employer-to-employee or lawyer-to-client talk, not the rationalization of a
formal decision for public consumption.
A huge proportion of agency interpretations also lies hidden in
decisions not to act. Some interpretive practices of this sort can be
uncovered - the us Securities and Exchange Commission's 'no-action'
orders sometimes give reasons, and NLRB General Counsel's opinions
almost always do, as do agency responses to petitions for rules and IRS
'Rulings' and advice letters. But much more is buried in internal memo-
randa, unrecorded meetings, unrevealing settlement statements or
consent orders, or the mental operations of a responsible official.
Developing a reasonably accurate picture of the practice of administra-
tive interpretation is a daunting task. We need careful comparisons across
varying domains of occasion, form, and process in order to build up a
reasonable set of pictures, images, rules of thumb. This work has hardly
begun.72
Even the most accessible materials, such as promulgated rules or
decisions in formal adjudications, raise difficult methodological issues.
Agencies are multiple and various, and they publish thousands of rules
and formal opinions every year. An investigator could not begin to look
at them all. Where should investigation begin? What are the relevant axes
of similarity or difference, task or technique, context orjurisdiction, that
would yield a reasonable sample? Should one take a random walk
through the Federal Register and the formal adjudicatory opinions of
major regulatory agencies? Or should one look at examples of major
interpretive controversies? The former risks focusing on the insignificant
and unrevealing, the latter on interpretive utterances shaped by the
72 See, e.g., Dale F. Rubin, 'Private Letter and Revenue Rulings: Remedy or Ruse?' (2001)
28 N.Ky.L.Rev. 50; Donna M. Nagy, judicial Reliance on Regulatory Interpretations in
SEC No-Action Letters: Current Problems and a Proposed Framework' (1998) 83
Cornell L.Rev. 921. Both of these pieces focus largely on the propriety of judicial
deference to such issuances, but each also discusses the nature of these agency decision-
making tools.
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selection biases of litigants and the strategic behaviour of agencies in
political and legal battles. What time period should be considered
relevant? Last year? The last decade? Post-Chevron? The decades before
and after Chevron?
Empirical investigation without a strong theoretical basis for the
inquiry presents endless possibilities. The wide range of interesting and
plausible hypotheses about agency interpretive practices yields a host of
potentially enlightening descriptive investigations. Do agencies, as some
wag once put it, 'consult the statute only if the legislative history is
ambiguous?' Are 'political' factors exploited or concealed in rendering
interpretive explanations? Do matters of 'policy' and bureaucratic
necessity dominate agency interpretive practices? Where and how does
judicial precedent intrude on agency interpretive judgements? Do
agencies have distinctive s.tyles of interpretation? Exactly how does inter-
pretation vary with occasion, form, and process? The empirical agenda
stretches before us like an uncharted sea.
Differing empirical methodologies may also yield quite different
impressions of agency interpretive method and practices. Examining the
statement of basis and purpose for the rescission of the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA) Motor Vehicle Safety Standard
208 (the 'passive restraints' or 'airbags' rule) that was at issue in the
famous State Fam7 3 case reveals little of the political context within which
that decision was made or insight into how the criterion of 'reasonable-
ness' in the Motor Vehicle Safety Act74 was being reinterpreted at the
Department of Transport. By contrast, a study of NHTSA policy develop-
ment, including the battles over Standard 208, would doubtless empha-
size those factors. 75 Hence, a broad survey of agency interpretive practice
as revealed in rule-making issuances may describe a different elephant
than a case-study literature, even if devoted to the same agency.
For the purposes of this essay, I made two brief forays into interpretive
practice, both limited to published legislative rules in the post-Chevron
era. Querying the Federal Register rules database yielded well over 600
hits where 'statutory interpretation' was at least mentioned. From that set
I selected two agencies, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), for a closer look.
Both had substantial numbers of issuances, and the two are engaged in
disparate administrative tasks and enmeshed in different politico-legal
73 Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. StateFarin Mutual Insurance, 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
74 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1409 (2005).
75 See, e.g., Michael Herz's case study of the EPA's permit-modification rule: Herz,
'Imposing Unified Executive Branch Statutory Interpretation,' supra note 22. For a
discussion and analysis of Standard 208 and State Farm, see Jerry L. Mashaw & David
Harfst, The StruggleforAuto Safety (Cambridge, MA. Harvard University Press, 1990).
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contexts. I selected a few rule-making activities from these agencies that
had resulted in judicial review.
The resulting data are impressionistic76 and obviously incomplete, not
only in the myriad ways previously discussed but because of the arbitrary
(i.e., atheoretical) choice of agencies and issues. My findings are more in
the nature of 'notes from the field' by an explorer in uncharted territory
than even a rudimentary guide to administrative interpretation as a legal-
cultural practice. When reading what follows, remember that Columbus
initially thought - and then stubbornly maintained - that the eastern
coast of Cuba was the beginning of the Asian mainland.
A A (SOMEWHAT) RANDOM WALK THROUGH THE RULES
A search in the Lexis Federal Register data base for EPA and HHS rules
that at least mentioned statutory interpretation produced sixty hits for
HHS and 179 for EPA. 77 This was an obviously under-inclusive approach,
but broader searches yielded thousands of results that Lexis would not
display. The intuitive underpinning of the search was simply to find some
instances in which the agencies were attending 'self-consciously to
statutory interpretation. Of the returned hits, I selected approximately a
dozen rules from each agency where interpretive practice was most
prominently on display. 78
76 Where possible, I have tried to cite directly to the rules that support my claims about
interpretive practice. In some cases, however, my conclusions are general enough that
such citation is impossible.
77 The search was '(statut! interp!) and "final rule" and (either "human services" or
"environment"),' with the range of results limited to rules issued between 25June 1984
(the date the Supreme Court decided Chevron) and 31 December 2001. Not all of the
returned hits were HHS or EPA rules, and not all of the HHS and EPA rules were final
rules.
78 The surveyed HHS rules are as follows: Foreign Establishment Registration and Listing,
66 Fed. Reg. 59,138 (2001); Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health
Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462 (2000); Standards of Compliance for Abortion-
Related Services in FamilyPlanning Services Projects, 65 Fed. Reg. 41,270 (2000); TANF
Revisions, 64 Fed. Reg. 17,720 (1999); National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program:
Revision of the Vaccine Injury Table, 60 Fed. Reg. 7678 (1995); Food Labeling:
Nutrient Content Claims, General Principles, Petitions, Definition ofTerms; Definitions
of Nutrient Content Claims for the Fat, Fatty Acid, and Cholesterol Content of Food,
58 Fed. Reg. 2302 (1993); Patent Term Restoration Regulations, 53 Fed. Reg. 7298
(1988); Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program (TANF), 64 Fed. Reg. 17,720
(1999); Child Care and Development Block Grant, 57 Fed. Reg. 34,352 (1992);
Methodology for Determining Whether an Increase in a State or Territory's Child
Poverty Rate Is the Result of the TANF Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 39,234 (2000).
The surveyed EPA rules are as follows: National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System: Regulations Addressing Cooling Water Intake Structures for New Facilities, 66
Fed. Reg. 65,256 (2001); Montana: Final Authorization of State Hazardous Waste
Management Program Revision, 65 Fed. Reg. 81,381 (2000); Technical Assistance Grant
Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 58,850 (2000); Findings of Significant Contribution and
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The surprise here, if there is one, is how unsurprising agency practice
appears from this type of sampling. At both agencies much of the dis-
cussion of statutory interpretation comes in the agencies' replies to
comments. Although the agencies sometimes anticipated interpretive
problems and noted them in setting forth the rules, I focused my analysis
primarily on the agencies' responses to comments that attacked their
proposed interpretations in an attempt to influence them to change
proposed rules. In other words, I focused on instances in which statutory
interpretation was contested.
In both sets of rules 'textualism' is often in evidence, including some
highly formalistic 'plain meaning' arguments. Legislative history is not as
prominent as one might have expected. 79 On the other hand, the agen-
Rulemaking on Section 126 Petitions for Purposes of Reducing Interstate Ozone
Transport, 65 Fed. Reg. 2674 (2000); Approval and Promulgation of Implementation
Plans: Nevada State Implementation Plan Revision, Clark County, 64 Fed. Reg. 29,573
(1999); Control of Air Pollution from New Motor Vehicles: Compliance Programs for
New Light-Duty Vehicles and Light-Duty Trucks, 64 Fed. Reg. 23,906 (1995); Indian
Tribes: Air Quality Planning and Management, 63 Fed. Reg. 7254 (1998); Opting into
the Acid Rain Program, 60 Fed. Reg. 17,100 (1995); Determining Conformity of
General Federal Actions to State or Federal Implementation Plans, 58 Fed. Reg. 63,214
(1995); Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 58 Fed. Reg. 4768 (1993); Hazardous Waste;
Codification Rule for the 1984 RCRA Amendments, 52 Fed. Reg. 45,788 (1987).
79 See, e.g., Foreign Establishment Registration and Listing, 66 Fed. Reg. 59,138 at
59,140-1 (2001) ('Section 510(I) of the act clearly and unequivocally requires foreign
establishments to register the name of a United States agent. As stated in the preamble
to the proposed rule, FDA interprets section 510(I) of the act as allowing only one
United States agent for each foreign establishment because section 510(I) of the act
refers to the United States agent in singular, rather than plural, terms ... The most
logical interpretation of the term, "United States agent," is that the agent must be in the
United States. If Congress intended foreign establishments to be able to designate
agents outside the United States, the words "United States" would be unnecessary in
section 510(I) of the act. Indeed, if Congress intended to require foreign estab-
lishments to be able to designate agents outside the United States, there would be no
need for any agent at all because FDA could simply contact the foreign establishment
direcdy.'); Findings of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking on Section 126
Petitions for Purposes of Reducing Interstate Ozone Transport, 65 Fed. Reg. 2674 at
2681 (2000) ('[T]here is simply no statutory basis for EPA to indefinitely deny relief to
downwind States harmed by pollution transported from upwind States. Congress pro-
vided section 126 to downwind States as a critical remedy to address pollution problems
affecting their citizens that are otherwise beyond their control, and EPA has no
authority to refuse to act under this section.'); Methodology for Determining Whether
an Increase in a State or Territory's Child Poverty Rate Is the Result of the TANF
Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 39,234 at 39,243 (2000) ('Based on our analysis, we believe that
there is enough reliability in the poverty estimates that, using statistical techniques, we
can make reasonable estimates of changes. We also believe that this is the clearest
reading of the statute and is the interpretation intended by Congress, given the sources
of data specified in the statute.'); Control of Air Pollution From New Motor Vehicles;
Compliance Programs for New Light-Duty Vehicles and Light-Duty Trucks, 64 Fed. Reg.
23,906 at 23,912 (1999) ('[Tlhe terms used by Congress, "establish methods and
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cies do not apologize (as many contemporary courts do) when invoking
legislative history, nor do they question its reliability. Floor statements
from the Congressional Record are used occasionally, but most reliance
is on committee reports.8 0
procedures," are not defined in the Clean Air Act. These terms are general in nature,
and can be readily interpreted as covering a broad range of agency action. "Methods"
and "procedures" would encompass both detailed prescriptions of how to conduct a
test, as well as broad general provisions, such as a requirement that testing be
conducted using good engineering practices. These terms are broad enough in nature
to include a process for future determination of the specific details of a test program,
based on submission of a proposed program. for EPA review according to pre-set
criteria. The term "establish" also appears general enough to include both the
establishment of detailed specifics at one time, as well as establishment of a process to
set detailed specifics at a future point. The text of section 206(d) does not appear to
indicate a clear Congressional intent to prohibit the adjudicatory approach proposed
by EPA, but instead employs terms that are broad and general in nature, allowing a
variety of potential ways to establish methods and procedures for testing. The legislative
history is limited, and does not provide any indication of a contrary congressional
intent.'); Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program (TANF), 64 Fed. Reg.
17,720 at 17,773 (1999) ('[Tlhe law plainly states that a parent may be disregarded
from the rate for not more than 12 months. We interpret this language to mean a
cumulative, lifetime limit of 12 months.').
80 See, e.g., Montana: Final Authorization of State Hazardous Waste Management Program
Revision, 65 Fed. Reg. 81,381 at 81384 n.8 (2000) ('Congress has already considered,
and rejected an explicit prohibition against EPA enforcement unless the State failed to
bring an action. Legislative History of the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. At 370 (Comm. Print 1991).'); Approval and Promulgation of Implementation
Plans; Nevada State Implementation Plan Revision, Clark County, 64 Fed. Reg. 29,573
at 29,578 (1999) ('The legislative history indicates that Congress intended to provide
flexibility to states regarding oxygen content, and did notwant to restrain that flexibility
by setting a federal mandate for a specific oxygen level that states must require. While
Congress deliberately rejected a federal mandate that would reduce the market
opportunities for various oxygenates, it did this with the goal of preserving state
flexibility, not limiting it, and the latter interpretation is consistent with this goal.');
Indian Tribes: Air Quality Planning and Management, 63 Fed. Reg. 7254 (1998) ('This
interpretation of the CAA as generally delegating such authority to approved tribes is
also supported by the legislative history, which provides additional evidence of
Congressional intention regarding this issue. See S. Rep. No. 228, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
79 (1989) ("the Act constitutes an express delegation of power to Indian tribes to
administer and enforce the Clean Air Act in Indian lands").'); Opting into the Acid
Rain Program, 60 Fed. Reg. 17,100 at 17,104 (1995) ('By its own terms, the March 7,
1991 letter did not provide guidance, much less a statutory interpretation or an
applicability determination for the units in question, that could be relied upon. In fact,
the March 7, 1991 letter indicated that this was a preliminary view based only on the
statutory language itself and did not indicate that any other material relevant to
statutory interpretation (such as legislative history) had been considered. Several
months thereafter, EPA sent a retraction letter onJanuary 7, 1992 to the City of Dover
reiterating that EPA's response in the March 7,1991 letterwas preliminary and that the
Agency was reconsidering the legal and analytic basis of the position it had taken in the
March 7, 1991 letter.') [citations omitted]; Medicaid Program; Eligibility and Coverage
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Neither agency makes much of anything of its relationship to other
'political' actors. There is some reliance on congressional acquiescence
in past practice 81 and on the necessity of complying with general execu-
tive orders.82 These agencies may be relying on the dynamics of their
political environment to inform their interpretations, but their enuncia-
tion of interpretive reasons leaves these factors decidedly in the back-
ground.
As one might expect, there is no attempt to address methodological
issues in interpretation. Those sorts of methodological controversies
bubble up in multi-member judicial panels where the judges or justices
disagree about outcome and pursue their disagreements through the
medium of methodological controversy. These agency final rules 'lay
down the law' with one voice, and their drafters seem to use whatever
methods are convenient to deal with the questions before them.
Requirements, 58 Fed. Reg. 4908 at 4919 (1993) ('The passage of section 1902(r) (2)
was the Congress' solution to the problem identified in 1984 when it first imposed the
DRA moratorium on the Department. Under the moratorium, the Secretary was not
permitted to take adverse actions against States because they were using more liberal
income and resource methods than those used under the cash assistance programs. The
Senate Report accompanying the 1987 amendment to the moratorium made clear that:
"The moratorium does not eliminate the limits on income and resources of eligible
individuals and families under section 1903(f)" ... Since, as its legislative history
indicates, section 1902(r)(2) is essentially the permanent codification of the DRA
moratorium, we see no reason to interpret it in a manner that would conflict with the
explicit guidance provided by the Senate Report with respect to its predecessor.');
Hazardous Waste; Codification Rule for the 1984 RCRA Amendments, 52 Fed. Reg.
45,788 (1987) ('EPA does not believe thatCongress intended the exemptions in section
3001, which were clearly aimed at hazardous waste, to extend to corrective action for
solid wastes under section 3004(u). Certainly nothing in the plain language of the
legislative history of section 3004(u) suggests that Congress intended to create any
exemptions for any category of solid waste.'). See also Standards of Compliance for
Abortion-Related Services in Family Planning Services Projects, 65 Fed. Reg. 41,270 at
41,272 (2000) ('[Wlhile the Secretary agrees that the statute could on its face be read
only to proscribe the use of Title X funds for the provisions of abortion, this is not
considered to be the better reading of the statutory language. Rather, the legislative
history of section 1008 indicates that that section was intended to restrict the
permissible scope of abortion-related services provided under Title X. The floor
statements by the section's principal sponsor, Rep. Dingell, indicated that the section's
restrictions on the "use" of Title X funds should be read as having a broader scope that
is urged by these comments ...') [citations omitted].
81 See, e.g., Standards of Compliance for Abortion-Related Services in Family Planning
Services Projects, 65 Fed. Reg. 41,270 at 41,272 (2000) ('The Department has
consistently, since 1972, read section 1008 as incorporating this legislation on activities
that "promote or encourage" abortion as a method of family planning. This
interpretation is well-known to Congress, which has not, to date amended section 1008.
Thus, there is legal support for this longstanding interpretation of the statute').
82 Indeed, 136 of the 179 original EPA hits reference one or more executive orders, and
fifty-two of the original sixty HHS hits reference at least one executive order.
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This small sample suggests some differences between HHS and EPA
practices that are probably not unexpected to those who know something
of both agencies and their regulatory contexts. HHS interpretations seem
much more straightforward and focused. They simply answer the ques-
tion raised by a commentator and go on to the next question. Case
authority is very sparse in HHS issuances, and there seems to be a decided
lack of strategic posturing in anticipation ofjudicial review.
EPA explanations are noticeably different. The interpretive analysis is
more elaborate, probably as a result of more extensive commentary by
well-organized interests, high levels of litigation, and a continuous need
at EPA to harmonize technical sections of multiple statutes that have been
passed at different times and are potentially working at cross purposes.
Not surprisingly, one finds the EPA citing and using the Chevron two-step
criterion to structure its interpretive arguments. 83 After all, Chevron is an
EPA case. The EPA rules also are heavier onjudicialjurisprudence and the
83 See, e.g., Control of Air Pollution from New Motor Vehicles; Compliance Programs for
New Light-Duty Vehicles and Light-Duty Trucks, 64 Fed. Reg. 23,906 at 23,912-13
(1999) ('Whether section 206 authorizes or prohibits such agency action is a matter of
statutory interpretation. The first question is whether Congress has directly spoken to
this issue, such that Congressional intent is clear on this specific matter. If the intent of
Congress is clear regarding a statutory provision, the Agency must follow that intent. If
Congress' intent is not clear on this specific issue, then the question is whether EPA's
interpretation of section 206(d) is a reasonable way to implement the authority dele-
gated in that provision. Traditional tools of statutory construction are used to answer
these questions.') (citing Chevron); Indian Tribes: Air Quality Planning and
Management, 63 Fed. Reg. 7254 (1998) ('In light of the statutory language and the
overall statutory scheme, EPA is exercising the rulemaking authority entrusted to it by
Congress to implement the CAA provisions granting approved tribes authority over all
air resources within the exterior boundaries of a reservation.') (citing Chevron);
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program: Revision of the Vaccine Injury Table,
60 Fed. Reg. 7678 at 7679 (1995) ('In enacting a particular statutory scheme, Congress
will often leave particular gaps with instructions to the Department charged with
executing the statute to promulgate regulations to fill the gaps and interpret the
statutory language. In promulgating regulations, the Department is limited to the
authority delegated by Congress, and is obligated to act consistent with Congressional
intent. Pursuant to these basic principles of administrative law, the Secretary is
promulgating this regulation to amend the Vaccine Injury Table.') (citing Chevron);
Determining Conformity of General Federal Actions to State or Federal Imple-
mentation Plans, 58 Fed. Reg. 63,214 at 63,221 (1993) ('The Clean Air Act does not
define "support" for the purposes of section 176(c) of the Act. If read in the broadest
conceivable manner, the "support in any way" prohibition might be interpreted to
include virtually all Federal activities, since all Federal activities could be argued to
support, at least in some remote way, an action that ultimately emits pollution. The EPA
does not believe that Congress intended the "support in any way" prohibition to be
interpreted in a manner that would lead to such egregious or absurd applications of
section 176(c) of the Act. Where the language of a statute is ambiguous, as is the case
here, an agency has the discretion to adopt an interpretation that is reasonable.')
(citing Chevron).
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use of interpretive presumptions gleaned from Supreme Court opinions,
such as the requirement that there be a 'clear statement' from Congress
for a statute to pre-empt state action 84 or the dictum that statutes should
be construed for the benefit of Indian tribes.8 5
In at least one of the rules I reviewed, the EPA proceduralized Chevron.
Its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for this rule articulates the reasons
for finding the relevant statutory provisions ambiguous and invites
comments on alternative interpretations of the act.86 Indeed, the EPA
rulemaking responses often move the discussion rapidly away from
'meaning' (Chevron step 1) to the question of 'reasonableness' (Chevron
step 2). The agency then relies on a host of sources to demonstrate the
reasonableness of its approach, including everything from the overall
purposes of the statute, to canons of statutory construction, to practical
problems of enforcement and administration. There is considerable
emphasis on its own past practice and on its prior interpretations,
whether or not they have ever been blessed by a reviewing court.
In a few instances agency practices seem to mirror some of the
normative expectations previously discussed. In one of HHS's rule-making
proceedings, commentators attacked the constitutionality of the rules.
HHS dismissed. the constitutional claims without extended discussion, and
certainly without any suggestion that its policies should be trimmed to
avoid constitutional challenge.87 Not much should be made of this
finding, of course. The sample here was small, and these constitutional
claims bordered on the frivolous.
84 See, e.g., Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; Nevada State
Implementation Plan Revision, Clark County, 64 Fed. Reg. 29,573 at 29,578 (1999)
('This interpretation is also consistentwith the general principle of avoiding a statutory
interpretation that preempts state action unless Congressional intent to do so is clear').
85 Indian Tribes: Air Quality Planning and Management, 63 Fed. Reg. 7254 at 7255 (1998)
('Further, it is a well-established principle of statutory construction that statutes should
be construed liberally in favor of Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted in ways
that benefit tribes. In addition, statutes should be interpreted so as to comport with
tribal sovereignty and the federal policy of encouraging tribal independence') [citations
omitted].
86 Determining Conformity of General Federal Actions to State or Federal Imple-
mentation Plans, 58 Fed. Reg. 63,214 at 63,218 (1993) ('On March 15, 1993, EPA
proposed that as a legal matter, the statute could be interpreted to support either the
inclusive or exclusive definition and both definitions were offered for public comment.
As a result of the public comments and consultation with other Federal agencies, the
final rule incorporates the exclusive definition of indirect emissions. The exclusive
definition is selected because it meets the requirements of section 176(c) of the Act,
and it: (1) Is consistent with the manner indirect emissions are covered in the
transportation conformity rule, (2) Can be reasonably implemented, and (3) Best fits
within the overall framework of the Act').
87 National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program: Revision of the Vaccine Injury Table,
60 Fed. Reg. 7678 at 7679-80 (1995) (rejecting a non-delegation/separation of powers
challenge to the Secretary's authority to promulgate the regulations at issue).
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In addition, in one of its rule-making proceedings, the EPA had to deal
with explicitly contrary circuit court authority. It clearly announced its
refusal to acquiesce in the circuit court determination, save in the case in
which it was rendered, and explained at length why it believed that the
circuit court opinion had been wrong.88
B LITIGATED RULES
My short field trip into agency statutory interpretation included a top-
down sampling of a few rules (four each) promulgated by HHS and EPA
and subjected to subsequent circuit court review.89 Some of these rules
were relatively high-profile controversies, such as the HHS rules concern-
ing parental notification requirements applicable to family planning
services and the EPA regulation establishing its nitrogen oxide emission
reduction program. Others were more run-of-the-mill, technical rules
that might have had important impacts on particular parties but were
hardly the stuff of high political controversy.
The story here is much the same as that pieced together in the
preceding section. EPA interpretive analyses were in general much more
extensive than those provided by HHS, and the EPA constantly invoked
Chevron and emphasized the 'reasonableness' of its interpretations. At
both agencies, examination of judicial precedent was scant, and there
88 See, e.g., Montana: Final Authorization ofState Hazardous Waste Management Program
Revision, 65 Fed. Reg. 81,381 at 81,383-85 (2000) (rejecting the statutory interpretation
adopted by the Eighth Circuit in Harmon Industries v. Browner, 131 F.3d 894 (1999)).
89 These rules and decisions were selected by searching in the Lexis 'Federal Cases After
1944, Combined Courts' database for '(statut! interp!) and "final rule" and (either
"health and human services" or "environment protection agency").'
The rules and review decisions for HHS are the following: Parental Notification
Requirements Applicable to Projects for Family Planning, 48 Fed. Reg. 3600 (1983),
reviewed in Planned Parenthood v. Heckler, 712 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Final Rule,
Utilization and Quality Control Peer Review Organizations, 50 Fed. Reg. 15,312 (1985);
Review of Photocopy Rule, 57 Fed. Reg. 4779, reviewed in Queen ofAngels v. Shalala, 65
F.3d 1472 (9th Cir. 1995); 51 Fed. Reg. 16,772 (interim final rule, 1986) and 51 Fed.
Reg. 31,460 (final rule, 1986) (interpreting P1 99-272 § 9105), reviewed in Cabell
Huntington Hospital v. Shalala, 101 F.3d 984 (4th Cir. 1996); Final Rule, 56 Fed. Reg.
8832 (1991), reviewed in Henry Ford Health System v. Shalala, 233 F.3d 907 (6th Cir.
2000).
For the EPA, the rules and review decisions are the following: Direct Final Rule, 60
Fed. Reg. 30,189; Final Rule (with response to comments), 60 Fed. Reg. 36,723 (1995),
reviewed in Sierra Club v. EPA, 99 F.3d 1551 (10th Cir. 1996); Final Rule, Preemption
of State Regulation for Nonroad Engine and Vehicle Standards, 59 Fed. Reg. 36,969
(1994), reviewed in Engine Manufacturers Association v. EPA, 88 F.3d 1075 (D.C. Cir.
1996); Final Rule, Nitrogen Oxides Emission Reduction Program, 59 Fed. Reg. 13,538
(1994), reviewed in Alabama Power v. EPA, 40 F.3d 450 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Final Rule,
Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Renewable Oxygenate Requirement for
Reformulated Gasoline, 59 Fed. Reg. 39,258 (1994), reviewed in American Petroleum
Institute v. EPA, 52 F.3d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
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was considerable reliance on past agency practice, technical industry or
scientific understandings of terms, and legislative history.
Looking at agency interpretive discussions side by side with reviewing
court opinions allows some further tentative comparisons. Agency effort
at explaining or justifying interpretations in their final rules does not
seem to correlate with judicial acceptance of the agencies' positions. This
may, of course, simply reflect the fact that agency effort is correlated
positively with agency uncertainty about the acceptability of its interpreta-
tions.
Perhaps most striking are the cases in which an agency's highly
nuanced interpretation - based on text, legislative history, statutory
history, past agency practice, the balance of competing congressional
purposes, and industry or scientific understandings - was rejected in
favour of judicial approaches based on pure textual analysis, plain
meaning, or the invocation of grammatical rules. These cases highlight
the strikingly different contexts of agency and court interpretive activity.
They also obviously raise again the question of how 'deferential' judicial
review can be when agency and court interpretations are informed by
different political, administrative, and procedural contexts that lead to
differing methodological commitments.
IV Concluding comments
Two points. First, my pathetic foray into empiricism suggests to me that
there are rich veins of interpretive ore to be mined just in agency rule
promulgations. But to really begin to understand agency interpretive
practice, other materials must be brought to bear, probably through case
studies of individual agencies or programs by scholars who understand
the substantive fields. We now know very little. But, unlike judicial
deliberations that will mostly remain black boxes, agency interpretive
practices may actually be more fully recoverable, if we put our minds to it.
The interpretive materials are more differentiated, have multiple sources,
stretch over time, and leave paper trails that can be followed.
More importantly, these investigations must be done to inform our
normative expectations about the appropriateness of agency interpretive
practice and its place in our understanding of what both democracy and
the rule of law mean in our ever-evolving administrative state. Doctrinal
discussions of these matters seem like cartoons when laid beside the
occasional empirical investigation of agency operation.
Chevron imagined politically accountable administrators with statuto-
rily delegated policy authority. But how much do we really know about
when, how, how often, and by whom agencies are called to account for
their interpretations? If hierarchical political accountability provides the
foundation for the Chevron doctrine, surely we ought to care whether that
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image is more than a figment of a fevered judicial brain.90 Meanwhile,
Skidmore conjures up an expert interpreter without asking to what degree
expertise may be derailed by precisely the accountability regime that
Chevron postulates. 9'
Meanwhile, the 'new administrative law,' 92 like the 'new public man-
agement,' 93 posits an administrative governance system that is more colla-
borative, flexible, or 'reflexive' than a system of administrative law
conceptualized either as a law of rules or as the exercise of delegated law-
making power subject to routinely effective political oversight. This new
vision is both 'micropolitical' and focused on techniques of guidance,
participation, and devolution. From this vantage point the agency
becomes not a rule-bound bureaucracy but a change agent; not a politi-
cally accountable lawgiver but a focal point for mobilizing and accommo-
dating affected private interests.
Where does agency statutory interpretation fit into this picture? How
much of the world of administration does it realistically describe? How
reliable are the new mechanisms of accountability that these visions
exalt? And what would these revised notions of legitimacy say about the
bases upon which a normative conception of agency interpretive author-
ity might be built? Inquiry into the empirical realities of agency interpre-
tive practice can provide a crucial window on these issues and an essential
step in assessing the legitimacy of administrative governance. For in the
end, I believe, our normative conception of the governance system that
we affirm must depend on what we know about the system that we have
and how we believe it works. Here surely I stand firmly in the tradition
that John Willis and his realist contemporaries pioneered - a tradition
that administrative law still too little observes.
90 Students of Congress and of regulatory agencies have quarrelled inconclusively for
years over the extent and effectiveness of congressional oversight. Compare Bernard
Rosen, Holding Government Bureaucracies Accountable (NewYork: Praeger, 1982); Ken-
neth W. Clarkson & Timothy J. Muris, The Federal Trade Commission Since 1970:
Economic Regulation and Bureaucratic Behavior (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1981); and U.S., Senate Committee on Government Operations, Study on
Federal Regulation: Congressional Oversight of Regulatory Agencies (S. Doc. No. 95-25)
(1977); with Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, 'Bureaucratic Discretion or
Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking at the Federal Trade Commission'
(1983) 91 J.Pol.Econ. 765; and John Ferejohn & Charles Shipan, 'Congressional
Influence on Bureaucracy' (1990) 6J.L.Econ.& Org. 1.
91 This is essentially the story told by Michael Herz, in which EPA eventually signs off on
an interpretation that it clearly believes to be incorrect. See Herz, 'Imposing Unified
Executive Branch Statutory Interpretation,' supra note 22.
92 See generally Jody Freeman, 'Private Parties, Public Functions and the New
Administrative Law' (2000) 52 Admin.L.Rev. 813.
93 For an extensive treatment, see Lester M. Salamon & Odus V. Elliott, eds., The Tools of
Government: A Guide to the New Governance (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
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